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*'''Access''': The attacker transfers the victim's bitcoin to their own wallet. Due to the decentralized and pseudonymous nature of the blockchain, the transaction is permanent. There is no tech support and the CEO is unavailable for comment.
*'''Access''': The attacker transfers the victim's bitcoin to their own wallet. Due to the decentralized and pseudonymous nature of the blockchain, the transaction is permanent. There is no tech support and the CEO is unavailable for comment.


Protecting private keys requires not only digital safeguards like [[hardware wallets]] and [[multi-signature]] setups, but also physical and personal security measures like [[Wrench Defense]]. Unlike traditional banking systems, Bitcoin offers no centralized authority to reverse fraudulent transactions, making prevention absolutely critical.
Protecting private keys requires not only digital safeguards like [[hardware wallets]] and [[multi-signature]] setups, but also physical and personal security measures like firearms and [[Wrench Defense]]. Unlike traditional banking systems, Bitcoin offers no centralized authority to reverse fraudulent transactions, making prevention absolutely critical.


=== Mitigation Strategies ===
=== Prevention Strategies ===
To reduce the risk of a wrench attack:
To reduce the risk of a wrench attack:


* Maintain [[OPSEC]]. Avoid publicly disclosing Bitcoin holdings or wealth. Use pseudonyms online and limit sharing on social media. Follow [https://x.com/WrenchDefense @WrenchDefense] if you're a Bitcoin psychopath, we follow all toxic plebs!
* Maintain [[OPSEC]]. Avoid publicly disclosing Bitcoin holdings. Use [[pseudonyms]] online and limit sharing on social media. Follow [https://x.com/WrenchDefense @WrenchDefense] if you're a Bitcoin psychopath, we follow all toxic plebs!
 
* Don't flex with flashy things in public. [[Watches]] will get you killed.
 
* Don't buy a Lambo. [[Win]] one instead!
 
* Minimize your digital footprint. Use a [[VPN]]. Run [[TailsOS]] on a [[Linux]] distro like [[Ubuntu]]. Avoid all [[KYC]] exchanges and services.
 
* Use a dedicated computer for Bitcoin activities. If it's a laptop, remove the [[Wi-fi]] card.
 
* Store [[Seed Phrase|seed phrases]] and [[hww|hardware wallets]] in secure tamper-evident [[Secure Locations|locations]], such as safety deposit boxes or a hidden safe. Remember that [[safes]] are not safe!
 
* Use multi-signature ([[multi-signature wallet|multisig]]) wallets requiring multiple keys held in different locations or by trusted parties, making coercion less effective.
 
* Geographic Distribution: Store [[metal backups]] (e.g., seed phrase copies) in multiple secure locations to reduce the risk of losing everything in one attack. Consider storing keys in different government jurisdictions to avoid a [[6102]] attack.
 
* Get a [[Guns|gun]], consider [[self-defense]] training, and install a home [[security]] system.
 
* Duress Codes: Some hardware wallets support duress PINs that unlock a [[decoy]] wallet with small amounts of bitcoin to satisfy attackers without revealing primary funds.
 
* [[Wrench Defense]]: Set up a Bitcoin [[tripwire]] in a decoy wallet that automatically sends out an SOS if you're wrench attacked. Trigger the silent alarm during a wrench attack to share your location with law enforcement or [[Liam Neeson]].
 
 


* Use '''multi-signature wallets''', requiring multiple keys held in different locations or by trusted parties.
* Use '''multi-signature wallets''', requiring multiple keys held in different locations or by trusted parties.
Line 68: Line 90:
* Store [[Seed Phrase|seed phrases]] and [[hww|hardware wallets]] in secure [[Secure Locations|locations]], such as a safe deposit box or a hidden safe. Consider tamper-evident storage solutions. Remember that [[safes]] are not safe!
* Store [[Seed Phrase|seed phrases]] and [[hww|hardware wallets]] in secure [[Secure Locations|locations]], such as a safe deposit box or a hidden safe. Consider tamper-evident storage solutions. Remember that [[safes]] are not safe!


* Use multi-signature ([[multi-signature wallet|multisig]]) wallets requiring multiple keys held in different locations or by trusted parties, making coercion less effective.
* Geographic Distribution: Store [[metal backups]] (e.g., seed phrase copies) in multiple secure locations to reduce the risk of losing everything in one attack. Consider storing keys in different government jurisdications to avoid a [[6102]] attack.
* Get a [[Guns|gun]], consider [[self-defense]] training, and install a home [[security]] system.
* Duress Codes: Some hardware wallets support duress PINs that unlock a [[decoy]] wallet with minimal funds, misleading attackers.
* [[Wrench Defense]]: Set up a Bitcoin [[tripwire]] in a decoy wallet on your phone. Trigger the silent alarm during a wrench attack to share your location with law enforcement or [[Liam Neeson]].


== Wrench Defense ==
== Wrench Defense ==

Revision as of 06:52, 20 May 2025

inspired by An Unending Variety of Topics by Nick Szabo https://unenumerated.blogspot.com/

Bitcoin Essentials

$5 Wrench Attack

A wrench attack is a physical coercion method aimed at extracting private keys or other sensitive information from a cryptocurrency holder. Even the most secure digital systems are vulnerable to low-tech, real-world threats, such as physical violence or intimidation, using a cheap tool like a $5 wrench as a metaphor. No amount of digital encryption or security can prevent an attacker from using force to compel a victim to reveal their private keys or seed phrases.

TLDR

Bad guys will kidnap and torture you for your bitcoin.

https://xkcd.com/538/


A $5 wrench attack typically involves:

  • Targeting: An attacker identifies a Bitcoin holder, often through public displays of wealth, social media posts, or compromised personal information. They are looking for low hanging fruit and easy marks.
  • Coercion: The attacker uses threats, physical violence, or intimidation to force the victim to disclose their private keys or access to their wallet. They have ways of making you talk.
  • Access: The attacker transfers the victim's bitcoin to their own wallet. Due to the decentralized and pseudonymous nature of the blockchain, the transaction is permanent. There is no tech support and the CEO is unavailable for comment.

Protecting private keys requires not only digital safeguards like hardware wallets and multi-signature setups, but also physical and personal security measures like firearms and Wrench Defense. Unlike traditional banking systems, Bitcoin offers no centralized authority to reverse fraudulent transactions, making prevention absolutely critical.

Prevention Strategies

To reduce the risk of a wrench attack:

  • Maintain OPSEC. Avoid publicly disclosing Bitcoin holdings. Use pseudonyms online and limit sharing on social media. Follow @WrenchDefense if you're a Bitcoin psychopath, we follow all toxic plebs!
  • Don't flex with flashy things in public. Watches will get you killed.
  • Don't buy a Lambo. Win one instead!
  • Minimize your digital footprint. Use a VPN. Run TailsOS on a Linux distro like Ubuntu. Avoid all KYC exchanges and services.
  • Use a dedicated computer for Bitcoin activities. If it's a laptop, remove the Wi-fi card.
  • Use multi-signature (multisig) wallets requiring multiple keys held in different locations or by trusted parties, making coercion less effective.
  • Geographic Distribution: Store metal backups (e.g., seed phrase copies) in multiple secure locations to reduce the risk of losing everything in one attack. Consider storing keys in different government jurisdictions to avoid a 6102 attack.
  • Duress Codes: Some hardware wallets support duress PINs that unlock a decoy wallet with small amounts of bitcoin to satisfy attackers without revealing primary funds.
  • Wrench Defense: Set up a Bitcoin tripwire in a decoy wallet that automatically sends out an SOS if you're wrench attacked. Trigger the silent alarm during a wrench attack to share your location with law enforcement or Liam Neeson.


  • Use multi-signature wallets, requiring multiple keys held in different locations or by trusted parties.
  • Store seed phrases in secure, tamper-evident locations, such as safety deposit boxes or a hidden safe. Remember that safes are not safe!
  • Consider geographic diversification of key storage to reduce the likelihood of simultaneous physical access.
  • Practice discretion by avoiding public discussions of Bitcoin holdings.
  • Employ decoy wallets with small amounts of bitcoin to satisfy attackers without revealing primary funds.
  • Set up a tripwire in a decoy wallet that automatically sends out an SOS if you're wrench attacked.


The $5 wrench attack serves as a reminder of the trade-offs between self-sovereignty and security. It reinforces the philosophy of "not your keys, not your coins," while highlighting that true financial freedom requires exceptional personal responsibility in both digital and physical realms.

Prevention Strategies:

  • Maintain OPSEC. Avoid publicly disclosing Bitcoin holdings or wealth. Use pseudonyms online and limit sharing on social media. Follow @WrenchDefense if you're a Bitcoin psychopath, we follow all toxic plebs!
  • Don't buy a Lambo. Win one instead!
  • Use a dedicated computer for Bitcoin activities. If it's a laptop, remove the Wi-fi card.


Wrench Defense

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